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Brexit Myopia 
By Professor Alex de Ruyter, Director, Centre for Brexit Studies 
News that Brexit negotiations continue to be stuck in the mire as it 
were comes as no surprise to me. I have doubted the UK 
Government’s sincerity in wanting to reach a trade agreement with the 
EU ever since Boris Johnson “got Brexit done” back in January. 
Of course he has not got Brexit “done” – unless done means to leave 
the EU at any price. The UK Government’s stated position of course is 
to essentially have a zero-tariff, zero-quota trade agreement with the 
EU, along the lines of the EU-Canada free trade agreement. 
However, the EU have been resolute in wanting agreement on 
fisheries and state aid before progressing to other areas of 
discussion, whilst the UK Government has expressed “frustration” at 
the EU’s refusal to engage in parallel negotiations on other areas and 
thereby expedite the production of a draft legal text. 
As I often get asked by journalists and media presenters as to what 
the odds of a “no deal” are in negotiations, it is useful to take stock of 
negotiations and touch on certain aspects of the Withdrawal 
Agreement protocol to assess this. 
First, let’s look at the issue of fishing – my colleague Steve McCabe 
covered this in a recent blog so I will be brief. The UK Government 
want to renegotiate the fishing quota and effect a 200-mile coastal 
exclusion zone. The EU have said no, and that adherence to the 
Common Fisheries Policy must stay. 
The economics of the sector are risible to the UK, with fishing only 
comprising about 0.04% of GDP so any rational negotiator wouldn’t 
their flag to the mast on this one, especially given that about half of 
the English portion of the “UK quota” is owned by foreign operators. 
Leaving the EUY will not change this, as others have argued, if the 
UK Government cared about smaller operators they would reform the 
way they allocate the quota and alter the rules. 
But no, instead the politics of fishing are striking in that a majority of 
the industry is based in Scotland. As most Scots voted to stay in the 
EU and support for Scottish independence is growing as the no deal 
threat edges closer, I would argue that Johnson is desperate to show 
Scotland that Brexit can deliver something for them. Hence the red 
line in the sand. 
As an aside, there are potential issues for Northern Ireland (NI) fishing 
boats when they land a catch in an NI port – namely, the possibility 
arises that there might be onerous paperwork as they’re viewed as 
having come from outside of the EU for customs purposes (since the 
territorial waters of Northern Ireland are not included within the 
Northern Ireland Protocol in the Withdrawal Agreement) – even if 
they’re “exporting” to Great Britain (GB). 
Indeed, there is an explicit stipulation in the Withdrawal Agreement 
Protocol on Northern Ireland that suggests this issue needs to be 
resolved by the Joint UK-EU Committee which will assess what goods 
between NI and GB are subject to customs declaration and under 
what circumstances. 
However this body is yet to be operational, with less than four months 
to go until we exit the Single Market and Customs Union, and the UK 
Government is dragging its heels on setting up the necessary 
customs infrastructure between GB and NI. So, lots of problems here 
(suffice to say, a trade agreement would significantly mitigate the 
need for customs checks, but would not eliminate them entirely). 
Let’s move on to state aid provisions – the EU negotiators have made 
clear their concerns that the UK Government could use state aid to 
gain what they would regard as an “unfair” competitive advantage 
against other EU members states, and hence seek to tie the UK to 
existing EU strictures in this regard. The UK negotiators in turn regard 
this as “unfair” and point to the EU-Canada agreement as containing 
no such provisions. 
However, the UK (unlike Canada) is regarded as a large, proximate, 
economy with deep economic links into the EU, most notably in terms 
of manufacturing supply chains but also in other sectors such as 
financial and digital services. For these reasons, I don’t see the EU 
budging on the issue of state aid. 
The other main sticking area is in the EU demand for a modicum of 
regulatory alignment in areas such employment law and 
environmental standards – it’s so-called “level playing field” provisions 
– again, seen by the EU as necessary to prevent what it regards as 
unfair competition by the UK. 
And here I would suggest, we reach the main sticking point. For the 
most ardent of Brexiteers, leaving the EU was always about rejecting 
Brussels regulatory oversight, in effect rejecting the EU’s socio-
economic paradigm. This is what they really meant by “taking back 
control”. 
Whilst the UK Government denies it, and displays little seeming 
appetite for a “bonfire of the regulations”, senior figures in Cabinet 
such as Dominic Raab, Liz Truss and Priti Patel, have made no secret 
of their desire to deregulate the economy further and reduce the 
scope of employment protection law, for example. 
It is this backdrop that should be borne in mind when assessing the 
UK Government’s stated desire to cut trade “deals” with countries 
such as the United States. Such a deal would mean the UK having to 
embrace the US model, with its weaker protections and lower food 
and environmental standards. 
Again, the economics of a UK-US trade deal are risible, with the 
Government’s own analysis suggesting it would only boost UK GDP 
by 0.16% in the long-term. However, for the free-market ideologues in 
the Government, a deal with the US would be advantageous in giving 
them a pretext to shift the economy in a more free-market direction if 
US companies are given access to the NHS, for example. 
Add to this the prospect of the UK Government appointing Tony 
Abbott, ex-Australian Prime Minister and zealous free-marketeer, the 
logic of the above is reinforced. This is a man who was PM for two 
years until his own party dumped him. His time in office was spent 
denying climate change and propping up the coal industry. 
As to the prospects of a UK-US trade deal, I would suggest that the 
fate of Trump will be pivotal – if Biden wins in November then much of 
the wind will be taken out of the Brexit sails, as the Democrats will 
look to rebuild bridges with the EU and embrace multilateralism. In 
this context, a trade deal with Brexit Britain would – to paraphrase 
Barrack Obama – return to the back of the queue. 
Abbott styles himself as a strongman but his abrasive style would 
alienate the above, leaving who – China? Russia? India? Turkey? 
Peru? Frankly, it’s hard to see a trade deal with any of these countries 
as being either desirable or feasible. 
But the UK Government will plough on in this regard so long as its 
inner circles are dominated by Brexit ultras. So, for these reasons I 
continue to doubt their sincerity in negotiating with the EU. Hence, the 
prospects of no deal are increasing, and emergency measures will 
need to be agreed by both sides to ensure civil aviation safety, data 
sharing and security cooperation. 
We really are stuck in the mire of a Brexit myopia…. 
 
